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PRECAP; Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State: Feeling 
the Effects of Medical Marijuana on Montana’s Rational Basis Test 
 
Luc Brodhead 
 No. DA 15-0055 Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 What is the scope and proper application of rational basis review 
in Montana? 
Does the Montana Marijuana Act’s (MMA) commercial 
prohibition on marijuana providers (limiting them to 3 patients and 
prohibiting any sale of marijuana) satisfy rational basis review? 
Does the MMA’s 25 patient physician review trigger (an 
automatic review of the standards of any doctor who certifies more than 
24 patients per year) satisfy rational basis review? 
Does the MMA’s provider advertising ban unconstitutionally 
infringe on protected free speech?  
Does the blanket ban on probationer access to medical marijuana 
satisfy rational basis review? 
Does the warrantless provider search provision (permitting state 
inspectors to enter and inspect provider premises) infringe on right to 
privacy? 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 In 2011, the Montana Legislature passed the MMA, a more 
tightly regulated version of the prior medical marijuana law.1 The 
Legislature passed the MMA in response to a rapid increase in 
cardholders (patients approved for medical marijuana consumption) and 
marijuana providers.2 The Legislature was specifically concerned with 
evidence of various abuses under the prior version the law, including 
issues such as the diversion of medical marijuana to non cardholders, the 
low threshold for getting cardholder status under the “chronic pain” 
category, and widespread advertising by providers.3 
Soon after the passage of the MMA, the Montana Cannabis 
Industry Association (MCIA) and other plaintiffs sued in Lewis and 
                                           
1 Br. of Appellant at 3–6, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State (Mont. May 6, 2015) (DA 15-0055). 
2 Id. at 4. 
3 Id. at 4–5. 
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Clark County District Court to enjoin various provisions of the new act.4 
The district court preliminarily enjoined several of the provisions such as 
the ban on commercial sale of medical marijuana, the ban on caregiver 
advertising, the warrantless caregiver inspections, and the 25 patient 
physician review trigger.5 The court reasoned that those provisions 
implicated the plaintiff’s fundamental constitutional rights, triggering 
strict scrutiny analysis.6 The state appealed the injunction on the 
commercial ban, arguing that the district court erred in applying strict 
scrutiny, fundamental rights analysis to the provisions.7 
In 2012, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the 
commercial ban did not implicate the fundamental rights to employment, 
to health, or to privacy, and that the plaintiffs had no fundamental right 
to medical marijuana.8 Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded 
the case to the district court to apply rational basis review to the 
commercial ban.9 
In 2015, the district court applied rational basis review to the 
commercial ban and the 25 patient physician review trigger, finding them 
irrational even under the less demanding test.10 The court concluded on 
summary judgment that the MCIA, challenging the commercial ban on 
the basis of denial of equal protection, had met its burden of showing that 
the provision created different classes of cardholders and imposed 
different burdens upon them.11 The court further concluded that the State 
failed to meet its burden of justifying the distinction with a rationally 
related objective,12 rejecting the State’s arguments that marijuana 
remains illegal under federal law13 and that the ban was necessary to 
prevent the abuses cited by the Legislature in 2011.14 The court took a 
similar stance on the 25 patient physician review trigger, finding that the 
state failed to show any rational justification for the provision in light of 
the fact that abuses by physicians had already receded under the enjoined 
version of the MMA.15 Accordingly, the court entered a permanent 
injunction on both provisions.16 
In the same decision, the district court enjoined the prohibition 
on advertising by marijuana providers on First Amendment grounds, an 
                                           
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Thomas J. Bourguignon, Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State of Montana and the 
Constitutionality of Medical Marijuana, 75 MONT. L. REV. 167, 174 (2009). 
6  Br. of Appellant at 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1166, 1168 (Mont. 2012). 
9 Id. at 1168. 
10 Appellee’s Response Br. at 2, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State (Mont. July 2, 2015) (DA 15-
0055). 
11 Order on Mot. for Summ. J. 19:5–7, Jan. 2, 2015 [DDV-2011-518]. 
12 Id. at 19:8–9. 
13 Id. at 20:1–7. 
14 Id. at 2:18–23. 
15 Id. at 15:1–11. 
16 Id. at 15:12–13, 21:19. 
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issue that the Montana Supreme Court had not previously addressed.17 
The court found that the provision made content-based distinctions on 
protected political and educational speech and found that the provision 
failed under strict scrutiny.18 The court took issue with the vagueness and 
overbreadth of the provision, finding it “to be meaningless as to what it 
prohibits.”19 
Lastly, the district court declined to enjoin the warrantless 
provider search provision and the ban on access by probationers.20 As to 
the warrantless searches, the court adopted the State’s argument that 
“regulatory inspections of closely regulated industries can constitute an 
exception to the search warrant requirement,”21 finding that medical 
marijuana was clearly a “closely regulated activity.”22 As to the 
probationer restriction, the court agreed with the state’s rational 
justification that the Department of Corrections should have discretion to 
limit the rights of people under its supervision,23 but asserted that the 
restriction should only apply on a case-by-case basis, when a reasonable 
nexus exists between the restriction and the person’s underlying 
offense.24 
Shortly thereafter, the State appealed the injunctions on the 
commercial ban, the 25 patient physician review trigger, and the 
advertising ban.25 MCIA cross-appealed the district court’s failure to 





A. The scope and proper application of rational basis review in 
Montana. 
 
Since the Montana Supreme Court required rational basis review 
of the commercial prohibition in 2012, these parties have disagreed over 
its extent and proper application, focusing on two main questions: 
whether the burden of proof shifts from the challenger of a statute to the 
State; and, the extent to which evidence is required in rational basis 
review and the proper use and scope of that evidence.27 In the order now 
under appeal, the district court substantially adopted and applied MCIA’s 
                                           
17 Id. at 9:9–15, 12:8. 
18 Id. at 11:10–14. 
19 Id. at 10:21–11:4. 
20 Id. at 14:7, 22:23. 
21 Id. at 12:24–25. 
22 Id. at 13:5–6. 
23 Id. at 22:10–15. 
24 Id. at 22:16–19. 
25  Br. of Appellant at 1. 
26 Appellee’s Response Br. at 1. 
27  Br. of Appellant at 13, 22–23; Appellee’s Response Br. at 18–20. 
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view of the rational basis test.28 The Montana Supreme Court’s decision 
on some of the questions presented here will likely depend on whose 
version of the test it applies. 
 
1. Arguments  
 
The State argues that under rational basis review the burden 
remains on the challenger, “to show the law is not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest,” or in other words, “to negate every 
conceivable basis which might support it.”29 The State further argues that 
even if it does bear a burden, it need not meet that burden with current 
empirical proof of the law’s effectiveness.30 Rather, the State must only 
present evidence of the Legislature’s unsubstantiated “rational 
speculation” as to a law’s justification.31 The State takes this one step 
further by asserting that evidence of the current state of the law should 
not influence the analysis because that amounts to a judicial 
determination of the law’s current necessity (i.e. its “wisdom or 
expediency”), not whether the Legislature had a rational basis for making 
the law at the time it was made.32 
 MCIA argues that under rational basis review, an equal rights 
challenger has the initial burden of demonstrating that the law treats “two 
similarly situated classes of individuals differently.”33 Therefore, MCIA 
argues, “once a challenger meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts 
to the government to justify the classification.”34 MCIA further asserts 
that the district court correctly supported its findings with evidence of the 
current circumstances of the law.35 MCIA reasons that such evidence 
sheds light on whether the legislative concerns  that motivated the 




 The Court will likely address this issue at oral argument, either 
as a stand-alone question or in the context of specific provisions. Either 
way, the Court will want to hear from the parties on the question of 
burden shifting and the question of whether the use of current 
circumstances evidence is necessary or even permissible in rational basis 
review. 
                                           
28 Order Mot. Summ. J. 15:1–11, 17:1–18, 20:8–21:7. 
29  Br. of Appellant at 13. 
30 Id. at 23. 
31 Id. at 23 
32 Id. at 22 
33 Appellee’s Response Br. at 13. 
34 Id. at 19. 
35 Id. at 10. 
36 Id. at 11. 
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The State’s position that they bear no burden under rational basis 
review will face an uphill battle. MCIA can point to numerous cases that 
indicate a positive burden on the State to show that the challenged law 
has a legitimate objective and to rationally connect that objective to the 
law’s classification.37 Therefore, the State will have to convince the 
Court to overrule its own precedent in order to adopt its approach. While 
the State has some federal authority in support of its position, MCIA will 
likely insist that the Montana Constitution offers a greater level of 
protection to individuals than 14th amendment, making the federal 
precedent less persuasive. 
In contrast, it is unclear how the Court will address the position 
that rational basis review permits, and even requires, consideration of 
evidence of a law’s current circumstances. On one hand, MCIA makes a 
compelling argument that in determining the rationality of a law, a court 
should consider the actual effect that the law has towards the 
government’s objective. The idea that a court should simply ignore 
evidence that a law is not achieving its objective seems to place those 
people negatively affected by the law at an unnecessary risk. On the 
other hand, the State makes a strong argument that it is not the Court’s 
job to fix an ineffectual law. Rather, it is the Legislature’s job. The Court 
may ultimately be swayed by the State’s argument that rational basis 
“constitutes the ‘paradigm of judicial restraint,”38 meaning that while a 
law may be clearly ineffective, courts must concentrate only on ensuring 
that, at the time it was made, the Legislature had some articulable reason 
for making it in a way that treats people unequally. 
 




 The State’s principle argument is that the district court based its 
conclusion on the faulty premise that the legislative objective of the 
MMA was to provide access to marijuana to those who need it. The State 
asserts that this assumption led the court to conclude that the commercial 
prohibition works in opposition to this objective.39 The State takes the 
position that the legislative purpose of the MMA was merely to continue 
protecting cardholders from prosecution, to provide a limited ability to 
cultivate marijuana, and to address the abuses stemming from the prior 
version of the law.40 Under these objectives, the State asserts that the 
Legislature was well within its discretion to ban commercial sales 
because such a ban would not lead to cardholder prosecution, would still 
                                           
37 Id. at 19. 
38  Br. of Appellant at 13. 
39 Id. at 11. 
40 Id. 
2015 PRECAP; MONTANA CANNABIS V. STATE 183 
  
 
permit limited opportunities to cultivate marijuana, and would address 
abuses under the prior law such as the diversion of medical marijuana to 
non-cardholders.41 
 The State further argues that the district court exceeded the scope 
of rational basis review by considering the effectiveness of the 
commercial ban in meeting these objectives. Under its concept of 
rational basis review, the state asserts that, if it had any burden at all, it 
was only to roughly estimate that the ban was related to these objectives 
at the time the provision was made.42 The State considers evidence of the 
law’s effectiveness and of changed circumstances since that time as 
beyond the scope of rational basis review.43 
 MCIA argues that it met its initial burden of showing a 
discriminatory effect by demonstrating that the MMA classified people 
and the ban treated those classes unequally. MCIA asserts that the MMA 
created a class of persons who need marijuana, but lack the ability to 
cultivate their own.44 MCIA points to the section of the MMA that 
provides “some debilitated persons in need of medical marijuana have 
the capability of growing their own—many do not.”45  
Having established a classification, MCIA argues that the 
commercial ban treats this class of people differently than others 
because, under the ban, providers will be unwilling to cultivate marijuana 
for them free of charge.46 Thus, MCIA argues that the commercial ban 
discriminates against them by making it impossible for them to access 
marijuana while giving access to those with means to cultivate it. 
 MCIA further argues that the State failed to meet its burden of 
showing any rational connection between a government objective and the 
banning of commercial sales. The State asserts the objective of providing 
access to cardholders, but MCIA observes that the commercial ban 
clearly has an opposite effect.47 As to the objective of reducing the 
abuses, MCIA observes that abuses have in fact decreased since the 
passage of the MMA despite the enjoinment of the commercial ban.48 
Finally, as to the objective of reducing liability under federal law, MCIA 
observes that federal law does not distinguish between commercial and 
non-commercial activity and that the US Department of Justice will not 
interfere with medical marijuana laws.49 Thus, without any rational 
reason to eliminate commercial activity, aside from the state’s 
                                           
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 12. 
43 Id. at 11–12. 
44 Appellee’s Response Br. at 14. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 26. 
47 Id. at 23. 
48 Id. at 4–5. 
49 Id. at 34–35. 
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speculation that some conceivable justification exists, MCIA concludes 




The Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the commercial 
ban will depend on how it applies the rational basis test. The State’s 
argument that the ban rationally relates to the reduction in abuses is 
persuasive if the Court limits its consideration to justifications the 
Legislature had in 2011. At that time, the Legislature was genuinely 
concerned about the diversion of medical marijuana to non-cardholders. 
Banning commercial sales could be rationally tied to prevention of this 
abuse because that kind of availability arguable created greater 
opportunities for diversion. 
However, if the Court requires substantiated evidence of the 
legislators actually making that rationalization or if the court permits 
evidence of the subsequent effectiveness of the commercial ban in 
actually preventing the abuse, then the State’s argument quickly falls 
apart. Ultimately, the State offers little concrete evidence in support of its 
conclusion that the MMA’s objectives are rationally related to the 
commercial ban and does not rebut MCIA’s assertion that abuses have 
decreased in spite of the commercial ban’s enjoinment. The State’s 
argument depends on the court giving the Legislature the deference that 
it believes is necessary under rational basis review. Despite the State’s 
lack of evidence, the Court may be persuaded by the idea that if people 
are truly discriminated against by the commercial ban, the proper remedy 
is to petition the Legislature to amend the law.51 
 




 The State’s argument for this provision parallels its position on 
commercial prohibition.52 The State attacks the district court’s 
consideration of the current circumstances of the law, specifically the 
evidence showing that abuses of the certification process by physicians 
have reduced despite the provision’s enjoinment.53 Like in its argument 
for the commercial ban, the State reasons that such evidence is irrelevant 
to rational basis review. Rather, the State insists that the court should 
have limited its review to what the Legislature faced in 2011.54 
                                           
50 Id. at 4. 
51  Br. of Appellant at 12. 
52 Id. at 28. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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Thus, the State focuses its argument on how the Legislature 
created the 25 patient review trigger in response to its understanding of 
the abuses occurring under the prior law. The State asserts that in 2011, 
the Legislature was concerned about evidence of doctors travelling the 
state, or using video conferencing, to certify hundreds of patients without 
actually establishing doctor-patient relationships.55 The State also points 
to the Legislature’s concern that physicians were not held accountable 
for certifications under the vague “chronic pain” category.56 The State 
asserts that these concerns constitute a legitimate state interest in 
controlling the certification of cardholders, and it concludes that ensuring 
a standard of care by creating an automatic review system for physicians 
is rationally related to that interest.57 
MCIA argues that evidence of the current circumstances of this 
provision show its ineffectiveness and therefore reveals its irrationality. 
MCIA points to the fact that the board of medical examiners has reported 
no problems with physicians abusing the medical marijuana certification 
process since 2011 despite the fact that this provision has never been in 
effect.58 MCIA asserts that this evidence demonstrates that the provision 
is not necessary to meet its purported objectives and reveals provision’s 
irrational nature.59 
MCIA further argues that even in 2011, the Legislature lacked 
rational basis to impose this provision because by 2010, the Board of 
Medical Examiners had sufficient authority to discipline certifying 
doctors who violated its standard of care; by that time, the board had also 
issued a directive prohibiting certification solely by videoconference.60 
MCIA insists that even if the evidence of the provision’s current 
irrelevance is not proper, then the evidence that the Board of Medical 
Examiners already had abuses under control in 2010 undermines the 




Like for the commercial prohibition, the Supreme Court’s 
decision on this provision will depend greatly on whether it views 
evidence of the current effectiveness or necessity of the law as proper in 
rational basis review. If so, the State will have to overcome the fact that 
complaints about issuance of medical marijuana certifications have dried 
up under the current law. The State could argue that the only reason 
abuses appear to have receded since 2011 is because the physician 
                                           
55 Id. at 28–29. 
56 Id. at 29. 
57 Id. 
58 Appellee’s Response Br. at 33. 
59 Id. at 34. 
60 Id. at 32. 
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review trigger has been enjoined. However, that would require the State 
to bring in its own evidence of the current necessity of the provision, 
something that it has declined to do thus far. 
However, even if the Court does not view current circumstance 
evidence as proper, MCIA still makes a persuasive argument that, in 
2011, the Legislature lacked a rational justification for this provision. 
The evidence that the Board of Medical Examiners had already taken 
steps to curb abuses cuts against the state’s argument that the Legislature 
was legitimately concerned about them. 
D. The constitutionality of the provider advertising ban. 
1. Arguments 
 The State argues the commercial advertising ban restricts only 
commercial speech and, therefore, should be subject to the less rigorous, 
four-part test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public 
Service Comm’n of New York,61 rather than strict scrutiny.62 The State 
uses statutory analysis to demonstrate that the provision only implicates 
commercial speech,63 asserting that the statute’s restriction to “not 
advertise” and its application only to “marijuana or marijuana-related 
products” is unambiguously limited to commercial speech.64 
 The State applies the Hudson factors to the provision and finds 
that it passes the constitutional test at the first stage. The State takes the 
position that the provider advertisements concern an illegal activity65 and 
points out that the first factor requires that the commercial speech at 
issue “must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading.”66 Because 
the illegal content of the speech is a threshold issue, the State argues that 
the court need not address the remaining factors. 
 Even so, the State runs through the remaining factors to further 
demonstrate the constitutionality of the ban. The remaining factors 
require that, when “there is a substantial government interest, the 
regulation must directly advance the asserted objective, and reach no 
further than necessary to accomplish that objective.”67 The State 
observes that the Legislature had a substantial government interest in 
removing the profit motive of medical marijuana,68 and argues that the 
provision directly advances that objective by suppressing advertising and 
reducing demand.69 The State concludes that the provision meets the 
final tailoring question because there is an “immediate connection” 
                                           
61 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
62  Br. of Appellant at 31. 
63 Id. at 33. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 38. 
66 Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565. 
67 Id. 
68  Br. of Appellant at 41. 
69 Id. at 42. 
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between the ends of removing the profit motive and the means of 
prohibiting advertising.70 
 MCIA argues the district court correctly found the ban to be 
unconstitutional on the ground that its “overbreadth implicates non-
commercial speech, both political and educational, which triggers strict 
scrutiny.”71 MCIA argues that the restriction implicates political speech 
because medical marijuana is a controversial and politicized topic and 
the restriction could be used to infringe on that discourse.72 
 MCIA further argues that even if the Hudson test applies to the 
provision, it is still unconstitutional. MCIA asserts that the State did not 
meet its burden of showing a substantial government objective by failing 
to offer a witness in support of its position.73 Just for good measure, 
MCIA also throws in evidence of the current circumstances of the 
provision  that show that the MMA has functioned effectively despite the 




 It is unlikely that the Court will adopt MCIA’s and the district 
court’s argument that the provision implicates political speech. The State 
makes a persuasive argument that the statute plainly restricts only 
advertisements for marijuana products. Considering its unambiguous 
language, MCIA’s argument that it may be used for other purposes has 
little weight. 
Rather, the Court’s decision on the provision may well depend 
on whether it considers the provider advertisements to concern a legal or 
illegal activity. The arguments of both parties hinge on that issue, but 
neither party can point to any precedent from the Court suggesting that it 
will go one way or the other. The State’s argument that marijuana is 
illegal under both state and federal law is simple, but it may be 
persuasive if the Court recognizes that those laws actually affect the 
content of the advertisements at issue here. 
Conversely, the Court may acknowledge that medical marijuana 
is legal in Montana for cardholders, meaning that the provision concerns 
only the use and sale of a legal substance. But, the Court has not yet 
ruled on whether the MMA actually legalizes medical marijuana in 
Montana or whether it merely creates a protection from prosecution for 
cardholders. The district court took up that issue below, inferring from 
the 2012 supreme court decision that the MMA makes medical marijuana 
                                           
70 Id. at 43. 
71 Appellee’s Response Br. at 40. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 41. 
74 Id. 
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legal.75 It is noteworthy that the supreme court hinted to medical 
marijuana’s legality in its decision despite its parallel acknowledgment 
of marijuana’s illegality under federal law. This does not necessarily 
mean the Court will follow the district court’s holding on medical 
marijuana’s legality, nor does it mean that they will uphold the injunction 
on the advertising ban, but they are certain to focus on both issues at oral 
argument. 
 




 MCIA argues on cross appeal that it is irrational to create a 
blanket rule depriving probationers of medical marijuana and that the 
district court’s solution of applying a case-by-case test is not possible 
under the provision. MCIA supports its argument of irrationality with the 
holding from State v. Nelson76 which requires that medical marijuana be 
treated as a prescription drug, not a controlled substance, in the context 
of conditions imposed at criminal sentencing. MCIA also points to the 
holding from State v. Ashby77 which affirms that, on a case-by-case basis, 
sentencing conditions must have a reasonable nexus to the offender’s 
underlying offense. Under these holdings, MCIA asserts that the 
government has no rational basis to restrict probationer access, so long as 
it cannot identify a reasonable relationship between the restriction and 
the underlying offense. MCIA concludes that the provision is facially 
irrational because its form as a blanket ban precludes any case-by-case 
analysis. 
 The State argues that the ban satisfies rational basis because the 
Legislature had a legitimate interest in preventing probationers from 
access to marijuana and because the ban is rationally related to that 
interest. The State asserts a legislative interest in allowing the 
Department of Corrections to establish its own sentencing conditions and 
in preventing probationer access because of their high rates of substance 
abuse and dependency issues.78 The State also undermines MCIA’s 
application of Nelson, arguing that it was based on the prior version of 
the law.79 
 The State agrees with MCIA’s and the district court’s conclusion 
that a case-by-case approach to this problem would satisfy the nexus 
requirement of Ashby. The State asserts that under the probationer ban, 
                                           
75 Order Mot. Summ. J. 8:1–8. 
76 195 P.3d 826, 833 (Mont. 2008). 
77 179 P.3d 1164, 1168 (Mont. 2008). 
78 Appellant Reply and Answer to Cross Appeal at 18, Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State (Mont. 
Aug. 3, 2015) (DA 15-0055). 
79 Id. 
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offenders would still have the opportunity to argue at sentencing for 
access to marijuana.80 The State concludes that, because of the 
inapplicability of Nelson and the availability of case-by-case 
determinations under Ashby, the provisions is rationally related to the 
purpose of deferring to the Department of Corrections and reducing 




 The Court will likely recognize the State’s asserted purpose in 
deferring to the department of corrections but may find that it lacks a 
rational relationship to the provision’s blanket effect. MCIA makes a 
persuasive argument that while a case-by-case determination would be 
rational, the provision does not permit that approach as it is written. The 
statute provides that “[a] person may not be a registered cardholder if the 
person is in the custody of or under the supervision of the department of 
corrections.”82 The State makes no argument as to how the Department 
of Corrections could get around that language and allow access to a 
probationer under any circumstances, including those where the 
probationer has a qualifying medical condition and has not committed 
any drug or substance-abuse related offense. Even so, the Court will have 
to decide whether this lack of flexibility in the provision makes it facially 
irrational, a potentially high bar. 
 




 MCIA’s principle argument is that the district court erred in 
applying a relaxed federal regulatory inspection standard in Montana 
where the Constitution affords additional privacy rights. MCIA asserts 
that the district court failed to perform a separate analysis of the 
provision, taking into consideration Montana’s constitutional right to 
privacy.83 MCIA cites to State v. Bowen,84 in support of this point which 
held that such an “independent analysis” is necessary in the case of any 
warrantless search.85 MCIA also points to the requirement under the 
Constitution’s privacy clause that the State must provide a compelling 
reason to invade privacy.86 MCIA asserts that the State failed to show a 
compelling reason for the inspection procedure and that the district court 
                                           
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 18–19. 
82 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–307(4) (2015). 
83 Appellee’s Response  Br. at 44. 
84 755 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1988). 
85 Id. at 1370. 
86 Appellee’s Response Br. at 44. 
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erred by not take this failure into consideration in a separate analysis of 
Montana privacy rights. 
 The State argues that the district court was correct to apply the 
federal standard for regulatory inspections and that the inspections under 
this provision are easily satisfy by that standard. The standard offered by 
the state comes from New York v. Burger87 where the United States 
Supreme Court held that regulatory inspections of “closely regulated” 
industries are an exception to the search warrant requirement.88 The State 
asserts that the district court had every right to apply the precedent of the 
United States Supreme Court, especially when it is as closely on point as 
Burger.89 Furthermore, the state observes that the plaintiffs do not 
contest that growing and providing medical marijuana constitutes a 
“closely regulated” activity.90 
 The State further argues that, even under a separate analysis of 
the provision, it would still meet Montana’s heightened privacy standards 
because of its reasonable nature. The State asserts that, under State v. 
Bassett,91 Montana’s privacy protections are limited by their objective 
reasonableness.92 The State reasons that providers choosing to participate 
in this industry have the reasonable expectation that inspections will 
occur, the expectation stemming from the fact that they went through an 
authorization procedure and have been given the opportunity to deal in 
an “otherwise illegal substance.”93 The state concludes that this 
reasonable expectation of an invasion of privacy makes the invasion 
itself reasonable and therefore satisfies Montana’s privacy protection 
standards. 
The State further concludes that the Legislature had a compelling 
interest in conducting the inspections and that the provision is narrowly 
tailored to that purpose. The State asserts that the Legislature had a 
compelling interest in enforcing criminal laws and, because it had 
created a narrow exception to those laws, the Legislature had a 
compelling interest in ensuring that providers stay within that 
exception.94 The State also asserts that the provision is narrowly tailored 
to that interest because the inspections occur during regular business 




                                           
87 482 U.S. 691(1987). 
88 Id. at 702. 
89 Appellant Reply and Answer to Cross Appeal at 20. 
90 Id. at 19. 
91 982 P.2d 410 (Mont. 1999). 
92 Id. 
93 Appellant Reply and Answer to Cross Appeal at 22. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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The Court will likely agree with MCIA’s point that a separate 
analysis of the provision is required in light of Montana’s privacy rights. 
While Burger provides an effective standard for analyzing search 
warrant exceptions for regulatory inspections, the Court cannot ignore 
the heightened and separate right to privacy found in Montana. 
However, even under that heightened standard, the State does 
make a separate and persuasive argument that the provision is 
reasonable. Considering the illegality of marijuana in Montana and the 
high standard for authorization under the current MMA, the Court will 
likely agree that providers have an expectation that inspection is part of 
that authorization. The Court will recognize the ease in which providers 
can exceed the limitations of their operations, transforming a legal 
enterprise into a criminal one with little effort.  
